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R v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood 
Legal commentary 
 
Mary Neal 
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, an unprecedented story unfolded in the UK media 
involving a young widow, Diane Blood, and her legal battle to bear the children of her late 
husband, Stephen, following his tragic death from meningitis at the age of only thirty. As the 
story unfolded in the media, the ethical and legal issues were explored in the courts and in 
academic commentaries.1 For all the controversy the case generated, the applicable law was 
clear and straightforward: the governing statute at the time of the case, the Human Fertilisation 
DQG (PEU\RORJ\ $FW  KHUHDIWHU µWKH $FW¶ SURKLELWHG the storage or use of gametes 
without the clear written consent of the gamete provider.2 Since the Act was unambiguous, and 
since Stephen Blood had never given his written consent to the storage or use of his sperm, 
there was no possibility of the HFEA permitting treatment within the UK. The question, 
therefore, was whether the HFEA would authorise the removal of the sperm abroad for 
treatment in another EU country. Initially, they refused, so the issue became a procedural one: 
had the HFEA reached their decision after appropriate consideration of the various factors 
which they were obliged to take into account?  
 
My concern here is not to examine the points of law which were directly at stake in the case, 
but to identify some wider themes which have relevance beyond the case itself and examine 
them from a predominantly (though not exclusively) legal perspective. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 See further DDŽƌŐĂŶĂŶĚZ'>ĞĞ ? ‘/ŶƚŚĞEĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ex parte Blood: Dealing with Novelty and 
ŶŽŵĂůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?The Modern Law Review 60(6): 840-856 
2 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Schedule 3. 
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The absence of consent and the principle of autonomy 
 
As Laurie J notes, Stephen Blood was unconscious throughout both of the procedures to 
retrieve sperm samples from him. Where a patient is unconscious, and so clearly lacking in 
autonomy, there is (obviously) no requirement to obtain his consent for an intervention. In 
discussing a patient who was unconscious throughout his hospitalisation, therefore, the 
principle of patient autonomy and the absence of consent to these interventions are irrelevant. 
Because this case involves assisted reproduction and the Act, however, it is relevant to have 
regard to the fact that Stephen Blood never consented under that statute; he never sought nor 
FRQVHQWHGWRµWUHDWPHQWWRJHWKHU¶ZLWKKLVZLIHXQGHUWKH$FW3XWWLQJKHUVHOILQWKHDSSOLFDQW¶V
position, Jackson J reflects that: 
 
From the point of view of the applicant, who desperately wants to preserve the option 
RIEHDULQJKHUODWHKXVEDQG¶VFKLOGLWVHHPVFUXHOWKDWDOHJDOWHFKQLFDOLW\FRXOGIRUFH
WKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIKHUKXVEDQG¶VVSHUP3 
 
Here, Jackson J is WU\LQJWRVHHWKHLVVXHIURP0UV%ORRG¶VSHUVSHFWLYHUDWKHUWKDQ endorsing 
this way of looking at the legal requirement for consent. For fDU IURP EHLQJ D µOHJDO
WHFKQLFDOLW\¶ RU D QHHGOHVVO\ FUXHO impediment to 0UV %ORRG¶V DFKLHYHPHQW RI KHU DQG 
reportedly KHU ODWHKXVEDQG¶VGUHDPRID IDPLO\ WKHZULWWHQFRQVHQWRI WKHSDUWLHVVHHNLQJ
treatment is of the utmost importance under the Act and KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVRQHRIWKHµWZLQ
SLOODUV¶RIWKHVWDWXWRU\UHJLPH4 Jackson J emphasises that the requirement for consent under 
the Act must also be seen as part of a whole process of deciding to embark upon treatment 
when she observes that µStephen Blood did not give consent in writing and he did not have an 
opportunity to receive counselling or be provided with such relevant information as is proper¶5 
 
Autonomy has a shadowy presence in discussions regarding what deceased persons and 
SHUVRQV ZLWK SHUPDQHQW LQFDSDFLW\ µZRXOG KDYH ZDQWHG¶ :H FDQQRW really respect the 
autonomy of such persons, of course, but in attempting to estimate what their wishes would 
have been, we are trying to do more than simply act in what we WKLQNDUHWKHLUµEHVWLQWHUHVWV¶
                                                          
3 Jackson J, paragraph 9. 
4 S SŚĞůĚŽŶ ? ‘ǀĂŶƐǀŵŝĐƵƐ,ĞĂůƚŚĐare; Hadley v Midland Fertility ServicesRevealing Cracks in the Twin 
WŝůůĂƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Child and Family Law Quarterly 16:437 
5 Jackson J, paragraph 5, emphasis added. 
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(if they are alive), or act in a ZD\WKDWLVREMHFWLYHO\µUHVSHFWIXO¶LIWKH\DUHGHDG,QVRIDUDV
we try to respect such persons personally, rather than impersonally, it could be argued that we 
are influenced by WKHµLPSULQW¶ of their autonomy, so that in such cases, autonomy is neither 
truly present nor truly absent as a factor.6 In the Blood case, although there was  ‘no hard 
HYLGHQFHRIDFOHDUDQGVHWWOHGZLVKLQWKHHYHQWRIGHDWK¶7 the court had some evidence of what 
Mr %ORRG¶VZLVKHVhad been during his lifetime. As Laurie J remarks, 
 
The applicant has argued that she and her husband were strongly committed to starting 
a family, and there is no reason to doubt this, nor should we dismiss lightly the common 
objective of the couple.8   
 
There was, however, no evidence of Mr Blood ever having contemplated assisted reproduction. 
This is relevant because assisted reproductive techniques (ARTs) raise particular ethical issues; 
for example, some people abhor the destruction of human embryos, which is a routine 
consequence of DVVLVWHGUHSURGXFWLRQ,WLVLPSRVVLEOHWKHUHIRUHRQWKHEDVLVRI0UV%ORRG¶V
testimony that she and her husband wished to start a family without assistance, to draw the 
conclusion that he would have been agreeable to the use of ARTs in pursuit of the same end. 
Not all of those who would countenance the former would also countenance the latter.  
 
This difference alone ought to dissuade any court from believing it can determine how Mr 
Blood ZRXOGKDYHUHJDUGHGKLVZLIH¶VSODQV. In fact, 0UV%ORRG¶V intentions were distinguished 
from what they envisaged together during his lifetime not only by the use of ARTs, but also 
because she proposed to conceive and bear a child after his death. Stephen Blood may well 
have contemplated the enterprise of conceiving and raising a child together with his wife; but 
the prospect of his wife conceiving and raising a child alone, after his deatha child with 
whom he could never have any kind of personal relationship, and could never µSDUHQW¶ is so 
far removed from what would have been within his contemplation while alive that the latter 
can hardly be relevant.9 ,QGHHGZHPLJKWFKRRVHWRLQWHUSUHWKLVZLIH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHLUMRLQW
plans as evidence that Stephen Blood seems to have wanted to be a parent, not to father a 
genetic child whatever the circumstances.  
                                                          
6 Jackson J acknowledges (but does not endorse) this kind of argument at paragraph 16 of her judgment. 
7 Laurie J, paragraph 12. 
8 Laurie J, paragraph 11. 
9 Laurie J acknowledges this at paragraph 11 of his judgment. 
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If we decide that it may well have been parenthood that Stephen Blood was enthusiastic about 
DQGWKHODQJXDJHRIµVWDUWLQJDIDPLO\¶LVVXJJHVWLYHRIWKLV, then nothing his wife did after 
his death could have achieved that for him. Only if his wish to start a family was motivated 
PDLQO\E\DEXUQLQJGHVLUHWRVHFXUHKLVJHQHWLFOHJDF\FRXOGZHUHDVRQDEO\UHJDUGKLVZLIH¶V
posthumous plans as being in fulfilment of µwhat he would have wanted¶; and even if we knew 
this to be so, there seems no reason why the law should facilitate such an endeavour (indeed 
there may be strong policy reasons for not doing so). In any case, Diane Blood seems to have 
made no such claim.  
 
Since Mr Blood was unconscious when the sperm was extracted, and was deceased by the time 
of the litigation, the issues of his consent and autonomy arose only indirectly in the case, via 
the acknowledgment that he never consented to treatment under the Act and the evidence about 
his wishes while alive. 0UV %ORRG¶V autonomy might also be relevant, however. Jackson J 
considers this: 
 
Mrs Blood might invoke her reproductive autonomy. She wishes to become a mother 
and she has a compelling interest in making this critically important decision about her 
body and her future family life for herself.10 
 
In the view of Jackson J, Mrs %ORRG¶V personal autonomy was simply one ethical principle 
which had be balanced against others, notably the need for a clear and consistent application 
of the framework set out in the Act.11 Although µSDWLHQW DXWRQRP\¶ often appears to trump 
other values in healthcare law cases involving  competent patients seeking to exercise 
decisional autonomy in relation to medical treatment, that is not the context here; patient 
autonomy has been held not to support any right of patients to insist on receiving particular 
treatments.12 As such, we are dealing in this case with autonomy as an abstract ethical principle, 
albeit an important one. The only sense in which autonomy seems to be relevant in a legal 
sense in this case is the sense in which it probably forms part of the ideological scaffolding of 
the right to free movement which ultimately won the day for Mrs Blood. 
 
                                                          
10 Jackson J, paragraph 16. 
11 Jackson J, paragraph 19. 
12 R (on the application of Burke) v. General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 
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µ7UHDWPHQW¶ and patients 
 
Although questions regarding what constitutes µtreatment¶ and who constitutes a µpatient¶, 
legally-speaking, were not directly at issue in this case, the case prompts some reflection on 
these matters. Considering Mr Blood first, he was clearly a patient while unconscious in 
hospital, until the point at which he was declared dead. When dealing with an unconscious 
patient, healthcare professionals have a legal and ethical obligation to act in the SDWLHQW¶V µEHVW 
LQWHUHVWV¶ (to ensure beneficence and patient-centred treatment). With this in mind, Laurie J has 
strong words for the professionals who acquiesced with Mrs %ORRG¶V request that sperm 
samples be extracted: 
 
WKHXQDXWKRULVHGLQYDVLRQRI>0U%ORRG¶V@ERGLO\LQWHJULW\LVXQHTXLYRFDOO\DQDVVDXOW
unless it can be demonstrated that it was in his best interests, as a patient, to undergo 
WKHSDUWLFXODUSURFHGXUH«WKHUHLVQRGLUHFWEHQHILW WR0U%ORRGZKDWVRHYHUneither 
immediately because he is in a coma, nor longer term since the interventions clearly 
occurred in anticipation of his death to bring about a benefit that would only arise once 
death had occurred.13  
 
The interventions to extract sperm from an unconscious, dying man had no possibility of 
therapeutic value for him and were not motivated by clinical need. As Laurie J notes, not only 
do they fail WKHµEHVWLQWHUHVWV¶WHVWWKH\µXQHTXLYRFDOO\¶DPRXQWHGWR assault. As such, they 
FDQQRWSODXVLEO\EHUHJDUGHGDVµWUHDWPHQW¶ 
 
What of Mrs Blood? The whole case seems to be framed as if she were a patient (someone 
VHHNLQJWRH[HUFLVHKHUULJKWWRµVHHNWUHDWPHQWDEURDG¶). Mrs Blood was not a patient at the 
time of this case, however; she had no diagnosis, and was not under the care of a doctor as far 
as we know. Instead, it is more accurate to say that she sought to become a patient. Did she 
become a patient when she was finally granted leave to take the sperm abroad and use it to 
create her family? I think this is questionable.  
 
In paragraph 7 of his judgment, Laurie J quotes from section 2(1) of the Act, which defines 
µWUHDWPHQW VHUYLFHV¶ DV µPHGLFDO VXUJLFDO RU REVWHWULF VHUYLFHV SURYLGHG WR WKH SXEOLF RU D
                                                          
13 Laurie J, paragraph 11. 
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section of the public for the purpose of assisting women to carry children.¶ :KHQ VXFK D
statutory definition exists, it supersedes (for the context covered by the Act) any common law 
understandings that may apply in other contexts. According to this definition, the intervention 
0UV%ORRGVHHNVWRDYDLOKHUVHOIRILVµWUHDWPHQW¶,QP\YLHZKRZHYHUWKHVWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQ
(which is undoubtedly authoritative in this case) is undesirably wide.  
 
I have argued recently elsewhere14 WKDW WRFRXQWDVµWUHDWPHQW¶ LQ WKHKHDOWKFDUHFRQWH[WDQ
intervention should either have intended therapeutic value for the person intervened-upon (as 
most cases of treatment do), or have a strong public interest justification (such as the removal 
of a healthy kidney from a living donor, which has no therapeutic value to the donor).15 In fact, 
in most cases of treatment, both of these elements are present.16 So which of these elements is 
present in 0UV%ORRG¶VµWUHDWPHQW¶? It is difficult to regard it as therapeutic, since Mrs Blood 
(as far as we know) had no relevant illness, nor any physical impediment to conceiving. Neither 
LVKHUSURMHFWVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\MXVWLILHGE\µSXEOLFJRRG¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQGHHGLWFRXOGEH
argued that there are public good considerations (perhaps associated with child welfare and the 
proper treatment of unconscious patients) which weigh against allowing it.  
 
,DPFRQVFLRXVRIWKHIDFWWKDWRWKHUµWUHDWPHQWV¶FXUUHQWO\VRUHJDUGHGPD\DOVRIDOOIRXORIWKH
test I have proposed above. For example, and staying in the same area , my test could lead to 
TXHVWLRQVDERXWZKHWKHUDVVLVWHGUHSURGXFWLRQWHFKQLTXHVZHUHµWUHDWPHQW¶LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI
single people or same-sex couples (who may seek to access them despite being neither ill nor 
infertile). A short answer to this is that I believe that a public interest justification can be made 
in these cases (along the lines that denying ARTs to single and gay people risks driving people 
who are desperate to have children into risky unregulated inseminations or even unwanted 
LQWLPDWHSK\VLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSVZKLFKPD\EHWUDXPDWLFIRUWKHPPRUHRYHU0UV%ORRG¶VFDVH
can be distinguished on the basis that what she sought was to bear the child of a particular man, 
now deceased. This is a preference (albeit a very strong and persistent one), not a condition; 
thus, the steps taken in pursuit of it ought to be understood as an exercise in preference-
satisfaction, not as treatment. The line between the two is not always clear, but sometimes, as 
in this case, it is. 
                                                          
14  ‘>ŽĐĂƚŝŶŐůĂǁĨƵůĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵŽĨ “ƉƌŽƉĞƌŵĞĚŝĐĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶ^&ŽǀĂƌŐƵĞĂŶĚDƵůůŽĐŬ ?ĞĚƐ ? ?
The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical Exception? (Routledge, 2015) 124-141 
15 It must also, of course, be justified by patient consent, or where that is impossible, by necessity or a  ‘best 
interests ?ĐĂůĐƵůƵƐ. 
16 Neal n 14 above, passim 
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Human dignity 
 
Like the principle of respect for autonomy, the value of human dignity is both an ethical and a 
legal value.17 Despite the derision of some famous detractors,18 the idea of dignity has enjoyed 
a renaissance in recent years, not least in the context of bioethics, where a growing body of 
literature is attempting to redress the neglect of the idea in that context (a neglect which may 
stem, at least partly, from the invisibility of dignity within the ethical 
approachprinciplismwhich dominated the first several decades of bioethical 
scholarship).19 Considering the Blood case from a dignity perspective may prompt dignity-
related anxieties about the treatment of Stephen Blood while unconscious. As Laurie J puts it, 
Mr Blood was subjected to µDQLQWLPDWHDQGKLJKO\LQYDVLYHSURFHGXUH¶20 ZKLFKRIIHUHGµQR
GLUHFWEHQHILWWR>KLP@ZKDWVRHYHU¶21 While his wife was presumably affected by shock and 
grief, the doctors were under an obligation to act professionally and in tKHLU SDWLHQW¶V EHVW
interests. In requesting the sperm samples, Mrs Blood was regarding her husband as a potential 
father, which seems to have been consistent with the way she had always regarded him, and is 
not necessarily incompatible with respect for his equal human dignity. By retrieving the 
samples, however, the healthcare professionals treated Mr Blood not as a patient with equal 
human dignity and interests of his own (which would only be extinguished upon his death), but 
as a source of gametes. Presumably, amid the emotion of the situation, they were moved by 
0UV%ORRG¶s appeals; in acting on them, however, they failed to respect the dignity of their 
patient, and their actions cannot be understood (as hers can) in terms of grief and shock.  
 
 
                                                          
17 For an explanation of the importance of human dignity, and why ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? 
ƐĞĞDEĞĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂƐ “ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞďĂƐŝĐŶŽƌŵ ? ?International Journal of Law in 
Context 10(1):26-46. 
18 See eg S Pinker (2008)  ‘The Stupidity of Dignity ?, The New Republic, available at: <http://www.tnr.com/ 
article/the-stupidity-dignity>; R Macklin (2003)  ‘Dignity is a Useless Concept ?, British Medical Journal 327: 
1419 ?20; and M ĂŐĂƌŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ:ůůĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞǀĂĐƵŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?Journal of Human Rights 5: 257 ?
270. 
19 See further D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw (Oxford: OUP, 2001); C 
Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011); and R Andorno (2013),  ‘The Dual 
Role of Human Dignity in Bioethics ?, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16(4):967-73. The dominant 
 ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůŝƐƚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞƐ ‘ĨŽƵƌƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇTL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (4th edition, Oxford University Press, 1994). 
20 Laurie J, paragraph 8 
21 Laurie J, paragraph 11. 
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Conclusion 
 
The eventual outcome of the Blood litigation was, of course, a happy one for Mrs Blood, who 
was permitted to travel abroad for treatment and eventually gave birth to two of her late 
KXVEDQG¶VJHQHWLFFKLOGUHQ$VVHULRXVDVWKHOHJDOLVVXHVFRQVLGHUHGDERYHDUHWKHUHLVDVHQVH
in which the birth of two much-wanted childrenand the creation of a happy family out of a 
tragic lossrepresents a powerful counterargument to the concerns I have raised. As a number 
of cases concerning so-FDOOHG µZURQJIXO FRQFHSWLRQ¶ have emphasised, however, the 
acknowledgment WKDWOHJDOZURQJVKDYHWDNHQSODFHDORQJWKHURXWHWRDFKLOG¶VFRPLQJLQWR
existence (and have even caused it) certainly does not lessen the extent to which that child is a 
µEOHVVLQJ¶LQWKHH\HVRIWKHODZ22 I think it is worth emphasising that principle in this context 
too. Whatever legal and ethical anxieties surrounded their conception, the Blood children are 
as valued by the law, by society, and of course by their remarkable mother, as any children 
ever were. 
                                                          
22 See, eg, McFarlane and another v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, and Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 
ALR 131. 
